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Abstract 
This article approaches the study of metaphors in dreams from an interdisciplinary 
perspective, which aims at bringing together the psychoanalytic tradition, and the main 
views that constitute what is commonly known as the contemporary cognitive theory of 
metaphor. Our perspective aims at showing how these approaches can (and need) to be 
integrated, and suggests why in this endeavour it is necessary to consider the personal 
background of the dreamer and her need to re-establish/confirm her identity within each 
metaphor. 
 
 
Introduction 
The most acclaimed contemporary theory of metaphor today is the Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory (CMT), fathered by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) and already 
anticipated in Ortony’s collection (1979). As Gibbs points out, “CMT is the dominant 
force in the contemporary world of interdisciplinary metaphor studies” (2013, p. 14). 
CMT suggests that metaphors are matters of thought rather than mere figures of speech. 
The two authors, a linguist and a philosopher, argue that metaphors characterize our way 
of thinking and contribute to structure our conceptual knowledge, which is grounded in 
bodily experiences and reflected in the metaphoric linguistic structures that populate our 
everyday language. In the past thirty years CMT has had significant influence in both 
linguistics and cognitive science, generating a large amount of supportive research (see 
Gibbs 2011 for an overview of the empirical studies supporting CMT), as well as critical 
contributions (see for example Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008). One of the main critiques of 
CMT is that in its first years of existence it was derived solely from the analysis of verbal 
expressions (McGlone, 2007). Another critic noted the fact that neuroimaging studies 
have recently shown that some metaphoric expressions are understood by native speakers 
on a linguistic level, as quickly as literal expressions, raising the point that at least some 
metaphors might remain a linguistic phenomenon, rather than functioning at a deeper 
conceptual level (Glucksberg, 2003). The debate remains open whether all metaphors are 
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processed by comparison or whether some linguistic metaphors are processed as 
polysemic expressions that require a simple meaning disambiguation on a lexical 
dimension (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008; Glucksberg, 2008).  
Another crucial debate raised by CMT is whether an alignment between two concepts (or 
two domains), always stimulates us to map exclusively features belonging to the source 
domain onto the target domain, or whether it pushes us to construct a new mental space 
where features from both domains are merged. The latter suggestion was proposed by the 
supporters of Blending Theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). According to this theory, 
metaphors stimulate us to create novel conceptualizations that result from the blending of 
two or more interacting mental spaces. 
In more recent years a large body of empirical studies tackled the activation of conceptual 
metaphors and image schemas (Lakoff, 1987), i.e. bodily-motivated conceptual structures 
that derive from recurring sensorimotor experience (e.g., SOURCE-PATH-GOAL), in a 
variety of cognitive tasks that are independent from linguistic metaphorical expressions 
(e.g., Casasanto, 2009; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002), and in a variety of modalities that 
range beyond the verbal one, such as gestures, images, movies, and music (e.g., Cienki, 
1999; Forceville & Urios-Aparisi, 2009).  
Far from denigrating the importance of Lakoff’s and Johnson’s work, the most recent 
insights in cognitive semiotics and metaphor studies have also underlined the fact that the 
experiential bases of conceptual metaphors are not only subconscious, but also deeply 
rooted in personal, interpersonal, and cultural dynamics, and for this reason it is not 
surprising that conceptual metaphors vary across time and cultures. Such insights have 
prompted a new interest in the study of creative, deliberate, and epistemic uses of 
metaphor, in which “the individual is recast as a permeable cognitive system coupled 
from the start with its environment and with individual and cultural practices” (Fusaroli 
& Morgagni, 2013, p. 6). From this perspective, as suggested by Fusaroli and Morgagni, 
the richness and variety of dimensions added to the original Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
“call for more extensive integration of CMT into a complex framework of social and 
cognitive dynamics” (Fusaroli & Morgagni, 2013, p. 5). In other words, the focus on 
social, communicative, and cognitive functions of metaphors has recently prompted a 
new wave of enthusiasm and scientific study. 
Within this complex and lively framework of discussion, we propose to address the 
analysis of the metaphors that emerge in the mind from a deep, pre-linguistic dimension, 
where the communicative function of metaphor is taken to an extreme border: the activity 
of dreaming. Since CMT has been proposed, to our knowledge only a few studies tackled 
the application of such an approach to dreams, which are traditionally considered a 
domain of psychoanalysis. On the other hand, as suggested by Borbely (2008), 
psychoanalysts have paid little attention to cognitive linguistics’ claims, as “their 
knowledge base gains expressions in the idiosyncratic terminologies of rival 
psychoanalytic schools, making integration with cognitive science claims more difficult” 
(Borbely, 2008, p. 412).  
 
In a notable contribution Marco Casonato (2003) analyzes the metaphors that emerge 
during therapy sessions, in relation to cognitive disorders and to the changes produced by 
psychotherapy. The author proposes an extensive analysis of the emerging conceptual 
metaphors, dividing them by type of disorder, and comparing patients in psychiatric 
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conditions to control subjects. For example, in a case study on patients with eating 
disorders he observes the emergence of metaphors such as BULIMIA-IS-A-GAME, and 
FASTING-IS-LOVE, which in control patients seem to correspond to the conceptual 
metaphors EATING-IS-A-GAME, and EATING-IS-LOVE. Casonato demonstrates that 
it is possible to track the process of cognitive transformation through the study of the 
metaphors used in clinical discourse and how they change during therapy.  
 
Another interesting contribution is provided by Terri Eynon (2002), who suggests that 
metaphors that appear in dreams seem to reveal crucial information for the therapist. For 
example, Eynon reports the dream of a patient, who was suffering from depression and 
had a dream where a sheep was being rescued from the bottom of the ocean, and slowly 
pulled up, out of the deep waters. As the author points out, this dream employs at least 
two well-known conceptual metaphors: GOOD-IS-UP (depression is the bottom of the 
ocean, while a healthy state of mind is up, out of the waters), combined with MENTAL 
STATES-ARE-LOCATIONS. The patient feels half way through the healing process, a 
coded message for the therapist that the therapy is producing good outcomes. Lakoff 
himself applied CMT to the analysis of unconscious thought, and provided the 
interpretation of some dreams (Lakoff, 1992, 1993, 1997), suggesting that the function of 
metaphors here is to “map the dream onto the meaning of the dream, giving relevant 
knowledge of the dreamer’s life” (1992, p. 9).  
 
In our opinion, these pioneering and valuable contributions aimed at integrating CMT 
with dream theory and psychoanalytic insights did not receive as much recognition as 
they should have. To the contrary, we realized that in the most recent literature about 
metaphors and dreams, the insights achieved from the integration of CMT and dream 
theory were left aside or even outlined in a misleading way. In a recent contribution 
published in a notable journal, for example, the authors (Edwards et al., 2013) indicate 
that “a common linguistic metaphor within the English language is the LOVE-IS-
JOURNEY metaphor” (2013, p. 3): this claim suggests that the conceptual nature of such 
a metaphor (highlighted also by the conventional use of capital letters) was completely 
missed. Moreover, Edwards et al. claim that “Lakoff (1993) proposes that cognition 
during dreaming […] involves the mapping of abstract concepts onto physical concepts” 
(2013, p. 3), while it seems to be commonly understood that the direction of the metaphor 
is the opposite, since portions of the meaning of the source domain are generally mapped 
onto the target domain, in order to shed light on its content. Lakoff himself writes, “what 
constitutes the LOVE-IS-A-JOURNEY metaphor is not any particular word or 
expression. It is the ontological mapping across conceptual domains, from the source 
domain of journey to the target domain of love” (Lakoff, 1993, p. 208). Even when 
Lakoff specifically says that the function of metaphors in dreams is to “map the dream 
onto the meaning of the dream” (1992, p. 9), he seems to suggest that the concrete 
realization of the dream (source domain) has to be mapped onto the meaning of the dream 
(target domain, plausibly a more abstract concept). 
 
We believe that the pioneering studies of psychoanalytic inspiration about the role of 
conceptual metaphors in dreams (e.g., Lakoff 1992, 1993, 1997) together with the new 
wave of interest around the possible applications of CMT (Fusaroli & Morgagni, 2013) 
can generate new insights and new research questions about, for example, the relationship 
between emotions and metaphors in dreams. In this sense, we believe that emotions are 
subconscious forces that provoke the emergence of specific metaphors in dreams. A long 
tradition of empirical studies supports the crucial role of dreaming for gaining insight into 
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our emotional life (e.g., Freud, 1900; Rycroft, 1979; Blechner, 2001; Hartmann, 2010). 
Hartmann for example suggests that dreaming is a hyperconnective mental activity in 
which the connections created are guided by emotions. Recent neuroscientific literature 
supports the idea that (at minimum) REM sleep is involved in the process of 
consolidating and regulating emotional memories (Walker & Van der Helm, 2009; 
Perogamvros & Schwartx, 2012; Groch et al., 2013). Still, these insights have not been 
clearly integrated with CMT in a contemporary fashion. We argue that metaphors that 
appear in dreams, which are then reported verbally to the therapist during therapy 
sessions, are manifestations of a world that pertains to the dreamer: they carry meanings, 
and they are structured in a way that allows these meanings to be communicated between 
internal parts of the individual. These metaphors surely lack the communicative aspects 
that characterize communication between two individuals, such as the pragmatic and 
inferential elements that stimulate us to moderate and modulate our messages, taking into 
account our listener’s previous knowledge and her/his ability to infer our communicative 
intentions, as indicated for example in Relevance Theory, proposed by Dan Sperber and 
Deirdre Wilson (1986). But as we will see, metaphors that appear in dreams are indeed a 
form of communication whose main objective is to implicitly carry specific emotions by 
means of cross-domain conceptual mappings, and in this way communicating them to the 
dreamer. 
 
Unconscious Thought in Psychoanalysis 
With his psychoanalytic theory, Sigmund Freud provided flesh for ideas that were already 
present in philosophy, addressed by philosophers such as Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, 
Schopenhauer, and Bergson. The idea of an unconscious thought was already “out there”, 
but it was somehow lacking structure and contents, which have been provided by Freud, 
and later developed in different directions, by scholars such as Melanie Klein, Donald 
Meltzer, and Wilfred Bion. Klein, for example, proposed an unconscious intended as a 
complex combination of intertwined internal entities, which communicate to one another. 
With this idea, Klein distanced herself from the more “economic” Freudian concept of 
unconscious. She also disentangled feelings (and in particular adult ones) from oedipal 
figures, providing more space and new dimensions for unconscious thought. For Klein, 
unconscious fantasies are the result of non-conscious activity that meets feelings and 
emotions deriving from the body and the mind. Wilfred Bion (e.g., 1962, 1963), starting 
from this perspective, provides further developments for the idea of unconscious thought, 
widening its boundaries even more. For Bion, unconscious thought is not only what has 
been removed, but includes all the realities that continuously develop the experiences 
inside the self. Today we know that our unconscious thought organizes the contents of 
our experiences by representing them internally. 
 
Unconscious thought, as described above, works day and night, without any apparent 
effort. Such activity is necessary so that we can feel, elaborate, and organize new 
thoughts, which can be expressed verbally or shown through our behaviours. In this 
framework, Carl Jung proposed the idea of unconscious thought as always active and 
wide enough to incorporate and represent the place where meaning is created, and thus is 
that from which consciousness emerges.  Bion (1962, 1963) suggests that the activity of 
dreaming is characterized by a natural function, called alpha, which is able to determine a 
vocabulary of emotionally dense images. In this perspective Bion’s unconscious is 
creative, complex, and infinite; as Grotstein suggests, Bion’s objectives are deeply 
ontological, epistemic, phenomenological, and full of hope (Grotstein, 2007). In some 
Language and Psychoanalysis, 2014, 3 (1), 4-22 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.2014.001 
8 
ways, Bion brought divinity back inside the human being, something traditionally 
conceptualized as an external entity.  
 
With regard to emotions, we believe that such internal states lie somewhere in between 
the body and the mind. This hypothesis finds partial support in Lakoff’s and Johnson’s 
theory, and in general in the embodied cognition account, according to which our 
conceptual knowledge and therefore our ideas (even the most abstract ones) are grounded 
in sensorimotor experiences, and as a consequence their processing provokes a re-
enactment of those neural substrates dedicated to sensorimotor perception and emotional 
response that are activated during real bodily experiences (Barsalou, 1999; Pecher & 
Zwaan, 2005).  
 
In principle we believe that not all our emotional responses to perceptual experiences 
enter our mental (conscious or unconscious) life. Some of them get ‘diluted’ within our 
body, throughout our organism, and eventually come to the surface of the body through 
somatic manifestations. On the other hand, emotions that enter our mental life through 
our bodies can get shaped in the form of primary metaphors, i.e., some emotions are 
understood by our mind in terms of bodily reactions, which are often associated with 
those emotions in our everyday experiences. As Grady points out (1997), these primary 
metaphors cannot be explained by more sophisticated cognitive mechanisms such as 
analogy or cause-effect relation, but instead derive from recurring correlations between 
particular types of perceptual experiences that allow these emotions to be transformed 
into mental objects. For example, Grady suggests that we understand affection through 
the bodily experience of physical proximity, and therefore of physical warmth. This 
recurrent correlation between feeling loved and feeling warm (for example, during 
development children perceive their mothers’ physical warmth), establishes a conceptual 
metaphor in our mind that can be expressed as AFFECTION-IS-WARMTH. From this 
perspective, the concept of affection becomes a mental object, which is metaphorically 
understood (at least in part) in terms of physical warmth. From this mental structure we 
can then derive linguistic expressions such as “she is a cold person”, or “she warmly 
welcomed us”. 
 
Primary metaphors such as AFFECTION-IS-WARMTH explain how specific emotions 
can enter our mental life and be understood in relation to our bodily experiences (as 
Lakoff and Johnson suggest: “metaphors allow us to conceptualize our emotions in more 
sharply defined terms”, 1980, p. 58). But in addition, there are conceptual metaphors that 
carry rather than explain emotions. In other words, conceptual metaphors that are not 
based directly on correlations in experience trigger emotional responses by comparing 
two apparently distant concepts. Emotions here are not explicitly explained by the 
metaphor, but they are implicitly triggered by the alignment of two concepts, thus 
behaving as conceptual mappings. This aspect, we believe, plays a crucial role when we 
look at converging insights across cognitive linguistics and psychoanalysis. 
 
Concluding, in line with the psychoanalytic tradition and with the cognitive linguistic 
theory, we believe that metaphors that appear in dreams are structures that can be 
interpreted, even though they cannot be predicted. As a matter of fact, Freud suggested 
that dreams are not just confused associations but rather the product of mental activity 
(see Domhoff 2000 for an extensive, even though critical, overview on Freudian and 
Jungian theories of dreams). Lakoff himself suggested “the imagery used in dreams is not 
arbitrary” (Lakoff, 1997, p. 106).  
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Within the dimension of communication, evolution provided humans with powerful 
cognitive tools that we use to interpret other people’s intentions and actions, simulating 
them in our own mind. From recent neuroscientific discoveries, we now know that human 
beings are equipped with neural structures called mirror neurons, which map sensory 
representations of others’ actions onto the observer’s neural substrates, allowing humans 
to understand (in specific circumstances) other people’s actions, intentions, and emotions 
by reproducing the same underlying neural patterns inside their own mind (e.g., Rizzolatti 
et al., 1996; Gallese et al., 1996). Such a revolutionary discovery suggests that in order to 
get as close as possible to a deep understanding of other people’s actions and behaviours 
we need to represent such actions and behaviours within ourselves. In other words, our 
visual system combined with logical inferential processes based on other people’s 
utterances is not enough for understanding the deep meaning and intentions of others. 
Our motor system needs to get involved as well. However, in order to get our motor 
system involved, we need to have a previous experiential reference inside ourselves for 
representing other people’s actions: as Iacoboni and his colleagues showed in 1999, and 
Gallese and his colleagues discussed again in 2011, the mirror neuron regions are only 
barely activated when we watch barking dogs, because our bodies do not afford such 
action and therefore do not allow a trustworthy internal representation of barking 
(Iacoboni et al., 1999; Gallese et al., 2011). This study highlights the self-referential 
quality of mirror neurons: in order to understand other people’s actions, intentions, and 
emotions, we need to have a somehow similar experiential background that allows our 
neural system to mirror another person’s behaviour. 
 
The discovery of mirror neurons suggests two crucial ideas: 1) in order to interpret 
another person’s dream, we must take into account and represent in our own mind the 
experiential framework (i.e., the personal background) of that person, because only by 
simulating internally similar patterns can we understand them; 2) dreams represent 
structured manifestations of the dreamer’s mental life, guided by the dreamer’s emotions, 
which emerge to allow the conscious self to access the contents of unconscious thoughts, 
representing them inside the mind through the dream. Such manifestations must already 
be part of the dreamer’s mental life, otherwise they could not be represented nor 
understood (i.e., we cannot simulate in our mind and thus deeply understand the action of 
barking because we are not dogs). As Rizzolatti suggested in a personal communication 
after an invited talk in Livorno, Italy, in the fall of 2013, it seems a logical intuition that 
mirror neurons also would be activated during dreams. Dream expressions are 
manifestations of natural, spontaneous, but not casual contents.  
 
Metaphors in Cognitive Linguistics 
Effective metaphors are classically considered a prerogative of a few talented artists, 
created for producing artistic effects, with the intention of evoking vivid scenarios. 
However, today we know that our everyday language is pervaded by metaphors — that 
they are used consciously or unconsciously every time we speak: if life “goes wrong” 
(even though literally it does not go anywhere) we might “fall into depression” (even 
though we do not fall anywhere).  
 
Metaphors allow us to think and talk about abstract and complex concepts, such as 
emotions, through easier and more concrete concepts. In this view, emotions to a certain 
extent can be understood through metaphors (e.g., as we described above, AFFECTION-
IS-WARMTH, and therefore a person that manifests affection is defined as warm). On 
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the other hand, emotions (internal reactions that lie in between the body and the mind) are 
implicitly carried by metaphors. In other words, metaphors carry emotions.  
 
For example, in Western culture, whose rhythm is defined through economic 
achievements and trading objectives, we often conceptualize time as if it was a tangible 
entity, such as money, and, thanks to this popular conceptual metaphor (TIME-IS-
MONEY), we can “spend time”, “earn time”, “waste time”, “lose time”, “save time” and 
so on, as we do with money. This metaphor is a classic of our times, and it is often used 
as an example for explaining CMT. However, to the best of our knowledge, the fact that 
this metaphor carries specific emotions — such as the feelings of urgency and desire (or 
greediness) to accumulate time as we accumulate money — is almost always left aside. 
We understand easily this metaphor because it refers to an emotional substrate that is 
peculiar to our culture, where individuals are constantly prompted to earn and consume. 
Time is thus related to emotional conditions that pertain to human survival, the 
achievement of economic wealth, and the concepts of life and death. The underlying 
emotions of urgency and transience lead us to associate time and money. 
 
Consider now the following novel metaphorical expression produced by Gibbs (2013) in 
a notable contribution where he assesses the strengths and the weaknesses of CMT: “my 
life as a professor has been one long, slow march through a windy desert”. As Gibbs 
argues, CMT suggests that people understand this metaphor by accessing the underlying 
conceptual structure LIFE-IS-JOURNEY (or CAREER-IS-JOURNEY). However, he 
notes that it is still unclear whether people process such sentences by fully accessing all 
the components of the more abstract LIFE-IS-JOURNEY structure. In any case, a 
deliberate expression like this clearly carries emotions and personal introspections that 
differ from, say, “my life as a professor has been a swim through an ocean full of sharks”, 
or even “my life as a professor has been one long, slow procession through a church 
hall”, even though all these three expressions point, eventually, to the LIFE-IS-
JOURNEY structure. In Gibbs’ example one could arguably perceive a sense of fatigue, 
struggle, and isolation. The second example brings forth emotions such as fear, danger, 
and transience; in the third example one can perceive a sense of sacredness, desire for 
absolute recognition, and spiritual glory.  
 
In this respect, it must be pointed out that CMT is traditionally concerned with the 
identification of those conceptual metaphors that are shared by individuals, and that 
characterize a way of thinking that is common of human beings. In other words, CMT is 
mainly concerned with those conceptual metaphors that are used by human beings to 
communicate with one another rather than with those metaphors that characterize a single 
individual’s identity. For this reason, conventional conceptual metaphors are commonly 
expressed at a superordinate lexical level.  
 
We believe that the ultimate function of metaphors that appear in dreams is to keep a 
trace, in the mind of the dreamer, of emotions and personal experiences that are important 
specifically to the dreamer and contribute to shaping the dreamer’s identity. For this 
reason, and supported by the recent suggestion of Fusaroli and Morgagni, we want to 
highlight the personal dimension of metaphors that appear in dreams and the importance 
that this dimension has for the dreamer.  
 
In psychotherapy sessions the therapist has the arduous task of carefully identifying the 
source and the target domains employed in the metaphors that appear in a patient’s 
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dreams, taking into account the patient’s past experiences that motivated the metaphor as 
well as the meaning that the dreamer attributes to the words chosen to describe the dream. 
This is not an easy task, as it will be shown in the case studies, because the meaning of 
the words chosen by the dreamer to describe the dream is also determined by the 
dreamer’s experiences (see Franco’s dream). From this perspective, words are symbols 
whose meaning is grounded in the individual’s experiences, and not simply defined on 
the basis of a social convention shared among individuals. The interpretation of the 
metaphors that appear in dreams should therefore take into account the personal life of 
the patient, focusing on the emotional contents that emerge within the metaphors, or that 
remain implicit in the mappings, which constitute the real feelings of the dreamer. 
Focusing on the emotional contents of metaphors that appear in dreams is crucial 
because, we believe, emotions provide the flesh and the force that structures the dream. 
 
The point that we would like to stress here derives from the optimal integration of the 
psychoanalytic and the cognitive linguistic traditions: we believe that both, metaphors 
that appear in dreams, as well as the conceptual metaphors that have been identified by 
Lakoff and Johnson, are (at least partially) grounded in emotions. Emotions are activating 
forces, provided with their own autonomy, that constitute the basis of our indeed 
precarious and inconstant rationality (Bichisecchi, 1999). For this reason, it is necessary 
to approach psychotherapy sessions not only by taking into account a patient’s 
phenomenological manifestations. It is preferable to observe both, the way a patient lives 
and expresses him/herself, as well as the way in which he/she dreams. In this view, 
metaphors can explain our thought’s activity, relying on the assumption that the 
comparison that has been brought to life in the form of a metaphor is meaningful for the 
individual, and it contributes to establish or consolidate a feeling of internal unity.  
 
Metaphor and Identity 
Human beings have the natural need of perceiving themselves as coherent units. We need 
to elaborate the experiences that we live, and make them ours. “Being ourselves” means 
living the coherence of our internal emotional and mental states. Metaphors emerge from 
these constraints and fulfil these needs. In this landscape a contradictory metaphor cannot 
live in a fairly healthy mind, because it would clash against the need of personal integrity. 
Our mind would naturally discharge what enters in conflict with our sense of unity. Think 
about those situations in which we contradict ourselves. We do not do it on purpose. And 
at the beginning our mind is not aware of the contradiction. But when we see the 
contradiction, we quickly search for a possible alternative explanation, or we deny the 
thesis, or the antithesis. We feel the urge to re-establish an internal order. Similarly, 
metaphors that emerge in our mind have to be coherent with our identity, rather than 
expressing concepts in contradictions with one another, because contradiction is not 
perceived as truth. While our mind tends to reject contradictions that pertain logic 
arguments, what happens with regard to emotions? Contradictory emotions generate an 
internal conflict, and it follows that our aware mind tends to eliminate or to deny the 
contradictions that rise not only on a logical level, but also on an emotional level, in order 
to maintain an internal coherence. When we are not aware of the internal conflict on an 
emotional level, we suffer.  
 
It is a metaphor’s destiny to confirm and consolidate the identity of the individual who 
produced it. It could be claimed that metaphors are expressed ‘out there’, in our everyday 
language, shared among human beings. But, as a matter of fact, each individual has to 
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integrate a specific metaphor with his or her personal identity and sense of unity. In this 
view, the broad spectrum of the conceptual metaphors identified by Lakoff and Johnson 
are accepted and shared by the individuals of a given community because they contain 
elements of a societal and a cultural identity to which they feel belonging.  
 
An individual’s identity, in this sense, is not only the expression of a continuous relation 
between experiential contents, as indicated by philosophers such as John Locke and 
David Hume, but it is also the human destiny within the reality in which we live: our 
deeper need to elaborate the experiences in which we live, in order to make them ours. 
Therefore, an individual’s identity is not only what makes him/her different from other 
individuals, but it is a necessary function that allows us to exist in our unitary mental life, 
which is the environment in which we live and for which we live. We exist because we 
have our own truth, our own unity, and our own uniqueness. Our mental life constitutes 
our primary environment, metaphors being the expression of its contents that allow us to 
feel congruence between the external and the internal world. 
 
Even though the interpretations of a dream might arguably be various, for the dreamer the 
range of meaningful interpretations of a specific dream cannot be too wide. The 
interpretative space of a dream is delimited by what is known about the dreamer, his/her 
description of the dream, and the associations (driven by emotions) that accompany the 
description. In this we agree with Hartmann, who suggests that “dreaming contextualizes 
a dominant emotion or emotional concern. The dream, or the striking dream image, 
explains metaphorically the emotional state of the dreamer” (Hartmann, 1996, p. 147).  
 
We believe that each individual wants to live inside his/her own ideas, which are 
associations and metaphors that are crucial for constructing and consolidating our mental 
world. An entertaining excerpt from Manzoni’s classic novel The betrothed summarizes 
this need of cultivating an internal world of ideas in which we believe, and which reflect 
our identity: “Donna Prassede governed herself with her ideas as some would do with 
their friends; she had very few, but to these she was much attached. Among these few, 
were a number unfortunately a little narrow and unreasonable, and they were not those 
she loved the least” (Manzoni, 1834, p. 307). 
 
As a last observation, we would like to point out that even a common say, such as “Paul 
is a sheep”, can be interpreted in different ways, according to different background 
experiences, emotional responses, and internal coherences of the listeners. As a matter of 
fact, the person who produces this metaphor might want to underlie the fact that Paul has 
a quiet and non-aggressive personality. But the listener, having a different mental world, 
might understand that Paul lacks of personality, that he is a follower. In this frame, the 
sheep is interpreted in light of its impact on the emotional and conceptual background of 
the two individuals. Thus, we should be cautious in perceiving dreams as just “mundane” 
mappings of universally salient properties of the source domain onto the target domain. 
 
In a communicative situation like the example sketched above, the need of transferring 
effectively a message and confirming our belonging to a common way of thinking, co-
exists with the need of maintaining an internal coherence, and respecting the coherence of 
our own mental world. The two needs meet in that part of our mind where we internalized 
and we represented our listener. The situation is different when the presence of the other 
(the listener) disappears, and an individual’s truth and ideas do not need to be mediated 
by a verbal expression, as it happens in dreams. The four case-studies reported below will 
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elucidate our claims. 
 
Taking into account the psychoanalytic tradition, Lakoff’s and Johnson’s CMT, The 
Conceptual Blending theory proposed by Fauconnier and Turner (2002), integrated with 
the need to focus on the dreamer’s past experiences and emotional contents, we would 
like to propose an analysis of some dreams, collected during therapy sessions (all patients 
have authorized the disclosure of the presented data, and the patients’ names have been 
modified to protect their identity). We avoided on purpose the use of specific techniques 
such as the transference, commonly used in psychoanalysis (see for example Freud 1916-
1917), because we wanted to leave to the patient the maximum degree of freedom of 
expression. The practice of interpreting dreams, we suggest, helps the patient developing 
metacognitive skills, and searching for meaning with a reinvigorated motivation. This 
activity makes the patient feeling passionate about elaborating daily-life aspects, as well 
as other individuals’ behaviours. We do not argue that the development of such 
metacognitive competences is an exclusive privilege of this type of analysis, but we 
believe that the practice of elaborating one’s dreams within this framework contributes to 
suggest the establishment and consolidation the individual’s identity and sense of unity. 
 
Case study 1: Piero’s dream 
Piero invents precision instruments for aircrafts, and in his spare time he is a fitness 
trainer. He is around 40 years old, lively, smart, and quite reserved. He finds very 
difficult to establish relationships with Italian women, because, he says, he does not 
understand their way of thinking. Piero lives in Italy, but he spent a few years first in 
California and then in Florida. A few months ago, in Italy, Piero met a woman, who 
works at a store where he frequently goes. They start greeting each other and chatting, 
every time they meet at the store. Piero decides to contact her on Facebook, asking for a 
date, and through the social network he finds out that she loves sports, in particular 
skating, skiing, and trekking on the mountains. He also finds out that she is currently 
dating another man. From that moment, every time Piero goes to the store, the girl avoids 
his stare and pretends she does not know him, provoking Piero’s delusion and sadness. In 
these days Piero reports the following dream during a therapy session: “we were both in 
California, at Venice Beach. She was skating and I was exercising. I was watching her 
and she was watching me”. 
 
The novel and personal metaphors that emerge in this dream are:  
 
- COMFORTABLE/WELCOMING PLACE-IS-CALIFORNIA  
 (mappings: feeling safe, feeling accepted) 
 
- PLACE WHERE ONE CAN EXPRESS HIMSELF AND WATCH OTHER 
PEOPLE-IS-VENICE BEACH 
 (mappings: feeling free to express oneself, feeling watched and appreciated) 
 
 
Both these metaphors carry emotions, mapped from source to target, which are the 
containers of an individual’s truth. As such, an individual’s truth involves necessarily 
both, body and mind, and needs to fulfil the need of internal unity and coherence. Both of 
these metaphors fit into the pattern of a more conventional conceptual metaphor, which is 
GENERIC-IS-SPECIFIC, but the emotions that emerge from those specific source 
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domains, target domains, and mappings, are peculiar of Piero’s identity and derive from 
his personal past experiences. 
 
Finally, the two participants to the dream are meaningfully staring at one another, and 
this physical action represents a reciprocal feeling of affection: because 
MENTAL/EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT-IS-PHYSICAL INVOLVEMENT, then 
AFFECTION-IS-STARE, and the mapping is the reciprocity of the action described in 
the domains. 
 
Piero has often referred about his life in California. Talking about women, he often 
pointed out that American girls tend to answer to a greet with a smile on their face, and 
they do not see any problem with going out with a man to get a drink or to see a movie. 
In comparison, Piero’s perception of Italian women is that they deny any kind of contact 
because they feel threatened by the fact that they perceive males to have only sexual 
interests in mind. Piero’s thoughts suggest that for him America is the place where he is 
free to express himself, seeing and being seen. Venice Beach is like a store window: a 
place where people are free to display their bodies and look at one another. As it was 
suggested above, love is often conceptualized as a journey. Even though Piero’s dream 
lacks of explicit metaphoric expressions that point to this conceptual metaphor, the 
dreamer made a journey, because he transferred himself and the girl to California. Since 
in California, according to Piero, things go in the way described above, also the girl that 
in Italy avoids his stare, behaves in a different way. The dreamer makes the girl acting 
consistently with the environment, as it was conceptualized by him. The Californian 
habits and culture influence the Italian girl’s behaviour. This suggests that Piero does not 
accept the girl’s refusal, and he does not want to blame this fully on the girl’s will. Piero 
seeks for an explanation of the girl’s behaviour, that goes beyond the individual. He does 
not want to recognize and accept the refusal, and all the emotional consequences that 
derive from it. For this reason, he denies the girl’s will and brings her to a place where, he 
knows, he cannot be refused or neglected, and therefore feeling inexistent.  
 
The women’s refusals, led Piero to lose his self-confidence, and to focus on his job, in an 
attempt to forget his feelings and his need of love. However, denying his need of love 
Piero denied a part of his own identity, and his integrity was not so solid anymore. The 
sense of integrity that makes us feel as a coherent unit passes also through the stare of a 
girl, on which affective fantasies have been projected. In this regard, everything that 
happens in a dream pertains the dreamer. Piero mentally brought the girl to California 
because it is in this place that he feels appreciated and loved, he can establish a 
communication with a girl, and he does not feel refused. In California she would skate 
and he would exercise, and they would stare at one another, and she would appreciate his 
physical ability. The girl would had confirmed and reinforced those aspects that Piero 
feels crucial for defining his own identity. This dream, therefore, constitutes an emotional 
experience that allows the dreamer to mentally reorganize past experiences: an essential 
step for the dreamer’s psychic balance. 
 
Concluding, we perceive a desire when we define it in our mind. For example, we desire 
a product after we have imagined it in our mind, and we have integrated it as an element 
of our mental world. At this point, if the product is denied to us, we feel bad, because it 
was already part of us, in our mind. For this reason, metaphors that appear in dreams, 
more than those that are used in verbal communication, reflect in a deeper way an 
individual’s needs. 
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Case study 2: Franco’s dream 
Franco is 43 years old. During a therapy session he reports the following dream: “I meet a 
friend and, while talking with him, I feel that I want to abandon myself to him”. Franco 
cannot describe explicitly his emotions during the dream, but he says that he did not feel 
passionate love for his friend.  
 
The meaningful elements are the friend and the action of abandoning oneself. The co-
existence of these two elements suggested that there was something unclear with the 
dream: the desire of abandoning oneself to someone else is generally related to feelings 
of love and admiration toward that person, but in Franco’s case, these feelings were 
apparently missing. In this case, it was necessary to understand not only the content of the 
dream, but also the meaning that the dreamer attributed to the specific words he used. As 
a matter of fact, as we will see, if we followed the common meaning attributed to the 
words used by Franco, we would had missed the point. In order to understand the 
metaphor of this dream, it is necessary to understand the cognitive overlap between the 
concepts of abandoning and succumb, in Franco’s mind. For the dreamer, these two 
concepts defined the same experiences, lived and cultivated in the relationship with his 
father. 
 
The concepts of abandoning oneself and succumbing are generally perceived as different: 
the desire of abandoning oneself to another person, triggers emotions such as trust, 
confidence, and faith. We associate to this action a sense of tranquillity, peacefulness, and 
letting go. Instead, succumbing or submitting oneself to another person implies the 
recognition of the other’s superiority, probably a feeling of pain and fear, in experiencing 
such superiority, and a lack of freedom. We think about domination and subordination, as 
well as surrendering to another person’s will, in order to avoid negative consequences. 
However, in Franco’s mind the two concepts seemed to be blended in a unique 
conceptual space:  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Franco’s blended space 
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In such conceptual blend both the emotions triggered by each original domain are 
perceived: the pleasure of meeting somebody to talk with co-existed with the desire to 
avoid a relationship of equality. These two aspects were united in a contradictory 
existence that was not cognitively understood, and it was affectively suffered. While 
abandoning himself, for the need of affection, Franco reduced his defenses, stimulating 
the other to overcome and use him. Franco’s will somehow wanted to succumb, so that he 
could abandon himself. The relationships that he entertained with other people 
encompassed simultaneously the abandoning and the personal submission. This was 
Franco’s way to establish relationships with others. By feeling submitted to another 
person, he felt that he could completely abandon himself to that person, and this made 
him feeling alive, used, real, functional, dominated.  
 
We reported this example to demonstrate that the interpretation of dreams can be 
misleading if we rely only on the linguistic expressions used by the dreamer, and on the 
meaning that we might attribute to them. Each linguistic expression must be carefully 
evaluated, in light of the dreamer’s personality and past experiences, because it can reveal 
conceptual blends that are peculiar of an individual. In other words, sometimes it is not 
enough to rely on the common sense and the shared meaning that we attribute to words. 
We need to pay attention to the way in which the dreamer uses specific linguistic 
expressions, in order to understand the meaning that he/she attributes to them in context. 
Words that humans use are tied with meanings that are themselves linked to emotional 
states that constitute the individual’s unity and identity. 
 
Case study 3: Riccardo’s dream  
Riccardo is a young married man, who works in the field of education, in an institution 
where also his wife is affiliated. He suffers from insomnia, and his greatest desire is to 
have a deep and restorative sleep. He has a deep fear: he fears that people around him 
might not appreciate him or having a high esteem of him. This worry is constant, and 
pushes him to seek other people’s appreciation, and to avoid critiques. He appears deeply 
respectful, correct, never annoying, and sometimes he observes and follows others 
people’s choices, even if this might cause him suffering. Considering these feelings, 
which characterize Riccardo’s personality, we can approach the analysis of one of his 
recent dreams with a key that allow us to give a very plausible interpretation of the 
metaphors involved. We chose this case-study because we would like to show a specific 
cognitive function of the metaphors that appear in dreams, which is a defensive function. 
In particular, in this case-study, Riccardo seems to use metaphors to defend himself from 
painful emotional states, which would deeply move and disturb not only his superficial 
tranquility, but also deeper emotional balances.  
 
The dream is the following: “A colleague at work was pregnant, she felt desperate and 
exhausted, and she could not come to work. She was sad and crying because her husband 
was not present during the pregnancy. Personally I was very surprised for this absence”. 
 
The metaphors that emerge from this dream, and are explained below, are the following: 
 
- IDEAS-ARE-CHILDREN with relation to development (therefore an important 
decision to be taken is represented by a pregnancy). More in general, 
THINKING/DELIBERATING-IS-GIVING BIRTH. 
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 (mappings: it’s a long and painful process, it requires energies and commitment) 
 
The pregnant woman is in the condition of having a new reality growing inside her. The 
pregnancy is perceived as the expectation of a new mental event, a new decision. 
 
 
- MENTAL ACTIVITY-IS-PHYSICAL ACTIVITY (in the case of the pregnant 
woman’s husband) and therefore not contributing to take an important decision is 
represented as a physical absence).  
 
 (mapping: requires active participation) 
 
 
This quite conventional conceptual structure suggest metaphors that seem to be 
conventional and shared across human beings. However, there is an additional metaphor 
that emerged from Riccardo’s past, which provides a leap forward in the process of 
interpreting correctly his dream. Riccardo had previously referred in a brief 
communication that his wife, who works at the same institution, needed to make a 
difficult decision that could bring her to live abroad for a couple of years. The 
consequences of such choice would be, for Riccardo, living apart from his wife. The 
apparent lack of weight that Riccardo attributed to this event aroused suspicions. A 
loving husband is hardly insensible to this situation. In fact, Riccardo has probably 
managed to keep himself detached from such emotional shock by hiding his wife behind 
a non-better-identified colleague, and thus establishing the overarching personal 
metaphor WIFE-IS-COLLEAGUE, which unravels a new interpretative key to the 
conventional metaphors identified above. When the dreamer thinks about the colleague, 
his feelings are weaker and less involving than when he thinks about his wife. Another 
interesting point is the absence of the colleague’s husband. The surprise perceived by the 
dreamer, in relation to the absence of the colleague’s husband, suggests that he expected 
the  husband to be there, to participate to the pregnancy. The dreamer, also in this case, 
projected on the relationship between the colleague and her husband, a situation that 
pertains himself and his wife, so that the emotional involvement is minimal. The dreamer 
is not present to the decisions that his wife is taking, which involve their future life 
together. He did not take part to the decision and avoided potential conflicts and attritions 
because these could had provoked his wife’s resentment, and loss of esteem. He preferred 
to leave the decision to his wife, so that she would continue to love him in the same way.  
 
Case study 4: Giuseppe’s dream 
Also in this case-study, as for the previous ones, we left aside the classic psychoanalytic 
idea of interpreting the dream on the basis of the transferences. We preferred to follow 
the ideas proposed by Bion: suspend judgment, forget preconceptions derived from 
theories, and just listen to the words and the associations provided by the dreamer. The 
interpretation, therefore, is achieved together by the therapist and the dreamer. 
 
“I am in a church, where my former Italian teacher has gathered some people to celebrate 
her retirement. She gives a speech, but some people are not listening. A city 
representative interrupts her and starts talking about his own things. This man walks 
around and he stains my brother’s shirt. My brother tells him to pay more attention, but 
the city representative instead of apologizing answers with offensive words. The man’s 
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wife tries to calm him down but he walks away. I follow him and tell him that he still did 
not apologize. He goes away, crying. I am satisfied”. 
 
The metaphors that emerge from this complex scenario are the following:  
 
- SPIRITUAL POWER-IS-DREAMER’S TEACHER 
 
 (mappings: humble, peaceful, mild) 
 
 
- MATERIAL POWER-IS-CITY REPRESENTATIVE 
 
 (mappings: arrogant, aggressive, unkind) 
 
 
The dichotomy between the church and the city representative suggests that there is a 
clash between a spiritual power and a material power, the latter being associated with 
arrogance. These metaphors, however, need to be related to the dreamer’s life and 
perception. It is necessary to understand the dreamer’s feelings and his way of connecting 
these contents. 
 
This dream emerges in the mind of an individual who is generally mild and respectful. He 
loves classic music and gardening. He is a good listener, lives profoundly the spiritual 
aspects of life, and expresses his ideas with clarity and determination. The Italian teacher 
had an important role in the dreamer’s life: she taught him about the importance of 
spirituality (not religious faith), making him feeling passionate about ancient history, 
medieval constructions, and nature. On the other hand, the material power, for the 
dreamer, is a necessary force that characterizes states and communities, and pertains 
concrete things. The dreamer is aware of the necessity to fulfil material needs, but he 
lives and he is projected towards the spiritual aspects of life, which he considers more 
valuable. In this scenario, the actions performed by the city representative and by the 
dreamer also acquire metaphorical meaning: in particular, the city representative’s actions 
can be interpreted as following: OVERPOWERING/DOMINATING-IS-
INTERRUPTING ANOTHER’S SPEECH (the city representative interrupts the teacher’s 
speech); IMMORAL-IS-DIRTY3 (the man that is perceived as immoral stains another’s 
shirt); MORAL DEFEAT-IS-WALKING AWAY (the city representative is defeated and 
walks away). 
 
The dreamer perceives a conflict between spirituality and materiality, two abstract 
concepts that he personifies in his teacher in the church and the city representative. In the 
confront, the city representative is not destroyed by the dreamer’s anger, but he is 
defeated by his words. The city representative in the end cries, expressing the presence of 
emotions inside him, which finally are manifested. Giuseppe lives inside himself the 
presence of a materialistic part, and he feels satisfied when this part is conciliated with 
                                                
3 The conventional metaphor is commonly expressed by MORALITY-IS-
CLEANLINESS, and it emerges in linguistic expressions such as “money laundering”, 
and “dirty job”, as well as in behavioural studies that suggested the existence of such 
metaphor beyond the above mentioned linguistic expressions (Zhong & Lilgenquist, 
2006; Schnall, Benton & Harvey, 2008). 
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the spiritual part, establishing an internal balance that helps consolidating the dreamer’s 
identity. 
 
The role of the brother is also functional for achieving the final objective. The dreamer’s 
brother is not exactly the dreamer himself, but a close person. Also in this case, if the 
dreamer himself was stained and offended by the city representative, his emotional 
conditions would had been more profound. Projecting the offense and its emotional 
consequences on his brother, the dreamer can maintain a sort of objectivity and partial 
dispassion toward this injustice, and he can approach and solve it, in order to re-establish 
his internal balance. 
 
Conclusions 
With this work, we tried to open the route to new interdisciplinary studies regarding 
metaphors and unconscious thought, in light of the recent plea launched by Fusaroli and 
Morgagni (2013), aimed at bringing CMT to a new level, where among other aspects the 
individual peculiarities and the individual identities of the human beings are taken into 
account.  
 
As we pointed out in this study, when we communicate verbally we want to achieve two 
main objectives: on one hand we want to transfer a message, enriched with emotional, 
affective, and cognitive contents; on the other hand we want to make our words adhere to 
our truth, in order to consolidate our own identity. Creating good metaphors contributes 
to pursue this goal; since we need to continuously define ourselves, and confirm the 
harmony between our mental contents, when we perceive a metaphor as convincing, our 
identity is consolidated. Human beings express themselves through words and metaphors 
not only for communicating and explaining contents to others, but also for 
communicating and explaining contents to themselves. Metaphors, in this view, are 
cognitive mechanisms that allow us to expose ourselves, get out of balance, and 
eventually re-compose our identity in a deeper and more compact sense of truth. Through 
metaphors we consolidate and expand our own identity. 
 
In the psychoanalytic tradition, and in particular according to Freud, metaphors are 
condensations: they gather contents and synthesize meanings in a new reality that is not 
anymore the simple sum of its constituents. In this process specific representations are 
substituted with new ones, which are associated to the original ones, by means of 
condensations. The result of such mechanism can be the substitution of an element with 
another, or the substitution of the verbal expression with another (see Freud 1900). The 
resulting new entity is an effect of the censorship that prevents subconscious desires from 
reaching our conscious thought. Thus, metaphors are seen as mechanisms that hide 
obscure truths. Freud’s focus, in this sense, is on the parts that compose the new truth, 
rather than on the new truth itself. Yet, this new truth, resulting from the construction of 
the metaphor, enters the (conscious or subconscious) mental life of the dreamer, and 
therefore needs to find a place and a connection with the other elements of the dreamer’s 
thought. We argue that metaphors that appear in dreams do not have simply the function 
to hide and cover deformed contents, but they are cognitive mechanisms that we use to 
confirm, reinforce, and expand our identity by enriching it with representations of 
emotional contents, whose power tries to break the surface of consciousness through the 
dream’s manifestation. In this sense, indeed “the individual is recast as a permeable 
cognitive system coupled from the start with its environment and with individual and 
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cultural practices” (Fusaroli & Morgagni, 2013, p. 6). 
 
Finally, we pointed out that in order to get as close as possible to another person’s 
thought it is necessary to carefully trying to reproduce a similar scenario in our mind. 
Neuroscientific findings support this view, in that we intuitively understand what other 
people do, by living inside our mind the same actions (e.g., Ramachandran, 2000). In 
order to understand and give meaning to other people’s words, we must reproduce inside 
our mind experiences that match those in the speaker’s mind. Language, in this sense, is a 
sophisticated tool that drives mental simulations also in absence of real perceptual 
stimuli. Yet, in order to fully understand another person’s actions and intentions, we need 
to simulate those actions in our own mind, and therefore we have to have somehow 
experienced them before. Through the case-studies proposed, we showed supporting 
evidence for the presence of conventional conceptual metaphors in dreams. However, we 
also showed that this is not the whole story: a helpful interpretation of the metaphors that 
appear in dreams needs to start from a basic level of interpretation, that starts from the 
mapping of features belonging to the source domain (the dream manifestation) onto the 
target domain (meaning of the dream manifestation). This process needs to take into 
account the personal experience of the dreamer, in order to disclose the emotional 
contents that are implicitly carried in the conceptual mappings. We also suggested that 
the main function of the metaphors that appear in dreams is to keep a trace of the 
emotional responses to personal experiences, in order to consolidate the dreamer’s 
identity. This goal, in some cases is achieved by the dreamer through a projection of deep 
emotional contents onto other participants to the dream (case studies 3 and 4). In this way 
the dreamer can protect his own emotional integrity, and at the same time can observe 
such emotional contents ‘from outside’, with a more objective eye. 
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